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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been one hundred years since White Star Line, a British-
owned shipping company, berthed what would be known as the most
infamous ocean liner ever built. The R.M.S. Titanic was the largest ship
of its time.' Heralded as the epitome of luxury, the Titanic offered its
privileged guests a degree of opulence fit for royalty.2 First-class guests
were treated to amenities previously unavailable aboard a ship, such as a
swimming pool, gymnasium, and Turkish bath, as well as the finest cui-
sine and spa treatments. 3 The Titanic's ill-fated voyage proved to be less
luxurious than promised, and the story of its sinking has become
legendary.
The Titanic's impact on popular culture looms large, but two les-
sons learned from the doomed ship are important in framing the issues
discussed in this note. The first is that the Titanic, for better or worse,
changed the world's perception of what it means to travel by ship.
* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2009, University of
California, San Diego. Writing a law review casenote is not something you can do on your own.
Many, many people contributed to this note. I would like to thank Dennis Lynch, William Widen,
and Bonnie Lesnik for their expertise and advice, my mom for her unwavering support, the men
and women of Starbucks for the free caffeine, and most importantly my wife Eva, for everything.
1. DANIEL ALLEN BUTLER, UNSINKABLE: THE FULL STORY OF THE R.M.S. TITANIC 249
(1998).
2. In fact, Sir Cosmo Duff-Gordon, Fifth Baronet of Halkin, and his wife Lucy Christiana,
Lady Duff Gordon, both British Royals, were among the R.M.S. Titanic's first-class passengers.
Id. at I 10.
3. Id. at 18.
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Before the Titanic proved it was possible to have all the conveniences of
a world-class hotel on a ship, ship voyages were often thought of as a
necessary burden of travel.' In the decades following the Titanic's
famed voyage, however, ocean liners began to advertise their ships, not
merely as modes of travel, but as alternative vacations.' Ship advertise-
ments from the 1930s and 1940s employed slogans such as "American
recreation goes to sea" and "Getting there is half the fun." A second, and
perhaps more important, lesson to come from the Titanic's voyage is
that often, beneath the surface and veneer of luxury, lies a reality that is
in stark contrast with its image. As described above, the first-class pas-
sengers on the R.M.S. Titanic enjoyed luxuries never before seen on a
ship. For the men, women, and children, however, who occupied the
lower class decks, as well as the ship's crewmembers, the Titanic was
far from luxurious.'
These two precepts learned from the Titanic are applicable to the
modern cruise industry as well. Passenger ships have continued to push
the boundaries of what is possible on a ship, becoming larger and more
grand over the last century, and the realities of life below deck, espe-
cially for the foreign-born workers who are employed by the cruise
industry, continue to be in stark contrast to the advertised joy and on-
board luxury proffered by the cruise industry. The MS Allure of the
Seas, built by Royal Caribbean in 2010, for example, holds the current
title of largest ship ever built.' Boasting the ability to accommodate
6300 passengers on eighteen decks, nearly two-and-a-half times as many
as the Titanic, the massive ship is home to twenty-six restaurants, a
state-of-the-art fitness facility, water-park, full-sized carousel, casino,
and, of course, the first Starbucks at sea.' The giants in the cruise indus-
try continue to sell the promise of pampering and royal treatment to the
public, and if the continued success and growth of the cruise industry is
any indication, the public largely feels these corporations have fulfilled
4. The Titanic did not invent the idea of the pleasure cruise. It did, however, take cruises to
levels never previously seen. The advent of pleasure cruises has been attributed to the berthing of
the ship The Britannia in 1840. Lydia Boyd, Brief History of the Passenger Ship Industry, DuKE
UNIv., http://library.duke.eduldigitalcollections/adaccess/ship-history.html (last modified Jan. 25,
2008).
5. Id.
6. Inside the RMS Titanic, TPD TURNER, http://www.titanicandco.com/inside.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011).
7. Allure of the Seas, RoYAL. CARIBBEAN, http://www.royalcaribbean.com/contentSitelet.do?
pagename=allureof theSeas (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
8. Physical Specifications of the M/S Allure of the Seas, http://www.faktaomfartyg.se/
allure of theseas_2010.htm; Find a Cruise: Allure of the Seas, ROYAL CARIBBEAN, http://www.
royalcaribbean.com/findacruise/ships/class/ship/home.do-jsessionid-0000JHJ914ZODhmhRcBVj
qptGu3:151bbptO4?br=R&shipClassCode=OA&shipCode=AL (last visited Feb. 1, 2011); RoYAL
CARIBBEAN, supra note 7.
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their promises. Over thirteen million passengers cruised in 2009.1 With
an average annual growth of 7.4%, and twenty-six state-of-the-art luxury
ships currently being commissioned, the cruise industry has emerged as
a continuously expanding multi-billion dollar business.10
For the workers below the deck, life at sea is a far cry from the
pristine image many of us imagine when we think of a luxury cruise.
Largely made up of foreign workers from underdeveloped countries,
cruise ship employees lead an arduous and difficult life." Often at sea
for six to ten months at a time, the employees are contractually obligated
to work ten to fourteen hour shifts, seven days a week, for pay so low
that critics of the cruise industry's employment practices compare the
life of a cruise ship employee to that of a sweatshop employee.12
The treatment of foreign cruise ship workers runs counter to not
only the image portrayed by the cruise industry, but the stated intention
of the United States government and courts to view foreign seamen as a
"favored class."" The cruise industry, although consisting primarily of
corporations with headquarters in the United States, operates almost
entirely outside the realm of U.S. labor laws, and what little protection
the U.S. does provide for these foreign workers has largely been weak-
ened through one-sided arbitration clauses that workers are mandated to
sign before starting their employment.' 4
This note will attempt to give some insight into the social and legal
realities of the cruise industry's foreign employees. I will address the
broader question of whether protection is being offered to this tradition-
ally protected class by analyzing the Eleventh Circuit Court's decision in
Thomas v. Carnival Corp., an opinion that, on its face, seems to revital-
ize the judiciary's commitment to protecting foreign seamen's rights."
9. Fla. Caribbean Cruise Ass'n., Cruise Industry Overview (2010), available at http://www.
f-cca.com/downloads/20 1 0-overview-bookCruise-Industry-Overview-and-Statistics.pdf.
10. Id.; Cruise Lines Int. Ass'n. Cruise Market Overview Statistical Cruise Industry Data
Through 2007 (2008), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/17337714/2008-CLIA-Cruise-
Market-Overview-Statistical-Cruise-Industry-Data; Ross A. Klein, High Seas, Low Pay: Working
Conditions on Cruise Ships, OUR TIMES: CANADA'S INDEPENDENT LABOUR MAGAZINE (Dec.
2001/Jan. 2002), available at http://www.cruisejunkie.com/ot.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
11. Klein, supra note 10.
12. War on Want, Sweatships, 1 (2002), available at http://www.waronwant.org/attachments/
Sweatships.pdf.
13. Bainbridge v. Merchs.' & Miners' Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278 (1932).
14. See Ross A. Klein, Cruising-Out of Control: The Cruise Industry, The Environment,
Workers, and the Maritimes, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives-Nova Scotia, March 2003,
at 17; Mariana Isabel Hernandez-Gutierrez, Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses in
International Commercial Contracts: Does the New York Convention Call for a Heightened
Enforceability Standard?, 18 WTR CuRNTs: INT'L TRADE L.J. 55 (2009); Rory Bahadur,
Constitutional History, Federal Arbitration and Seamen's Rights Sinking in a Sea of Sweatshop
Labor, 39 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 157 (2008).
15. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009).
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In Thomas, the Eleventh Circuit held void a foreign choice-of-law provi-
sion contained in an employment contract between Carnival Cruise
Lines and Puliyurumpil Mathew Thomas, a waiter on the cruise ship
Imagination.'6 Recognizing that choice-of-law provisions could be used
by employers to abrogate federal rights in the course of arbitration,
Thomas appears to signal a shift in federal judicial practice from that of
complete enforcement of private arbitration agreements to a more bal-
anced approach which takes into consideration the long-standing federal
policy of protecting foreign seafarers."
This note will, however, show that, for the men and women who
are employed in the cruise industry, the Thomas decision is a victory in
name only. The Thomas decision stands for the proposition that the U.S.
court system will uphold access, if not to our courts, then at least to our
laws. Under the system in which the cruise industry currently operates,
however, it is likely that an employee's right to legal relief will have
been extinguished long before the arbitration process begins.
In support of this thesis this note will explore a number of topics
relating to various aspects of the cruise industry. Part II will examine
what life on a cruise ship is like for foreign employees. In doing so it
will analyze how the use of flags of convenience, the practice of regis-
tering a ship under a foreign country's flag in order to have the laws of
that country apply, allows the cruise industry to treat its workers in ways
that would be deemed unconscionable under U.S. labor laws. Part III
will consider the historical development of Congressional protection of
foreign seamen. Relatedly, it will analyze how the government's policy
of offering such protection to foreign seamen runs counter to its policy
of promoting and enforcing international arbitration agreements. Part IV
will continue the discussion of arbitration with an analysis of the
Thomas decision and the shifts Thomas appears to signify. These shifts,
however, will be shown to be merely illusory and this note will conclude
with an overview of how the areas of law discussed here work in tandem
to create a system of inequity that, despite the Thomas decision, not only
exploits foreign cruise workers, but practically obliterates any chance
afforded to them under U.S. law of receiving an adequate remedy.
II. THE LIFE OF A FOREIGN CRUISE SHIP EMPLOYEE
Cruise ship personnel can be divided into two basic types. For
employees who work as entertainers, croupiers, bartenders, customer
service representatives, or other highly visible positions, a job on a
16. Id. at 1116.
17. Id. at 1122.
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cruise ship can be a dream job." Coming almost exclusively from indus-
trialized countries, the men and women who work in these type of posi-
tions tend to be "young, single, and often in some way still supported by
their parents."l 9 For these workers, the motivation for choosing to work
on a cruise ship is largely due to a sense of adventure and a desire to see
the world. 20 By contrast, for the men and women who occupy the less
glamorous positions on a cruise ship's staff, such as the laundresses,
cooks, pantrymen, and galley stewards, to name a few, the motivation
for choosing this line of work is almost exclusively economic. 21 These
workers, who tend to come from poor, under-industrialized countries-
such as Peru, Uruguay, Philippines, Indonesia, rural China, and the Car-
ibbean-often are forced to find work abroad because of desperate eco-
nomic conditions in their home country, and because they have
dependents relying on them to send money back home. 22 These workers
enter into the system in a state of economic desperation, and, as a result,
are easy targets for exploitation and abuse.23
The exploitation often begins long before their first day of work.
Private recruiting offices located in under-industrialized nations are
often the only way for an unskilled worker to secure a position on a
cruise ship.24 Although International Labour Organization regulations
require that the cruise line pay any fees charged by the recruiting offices,
it is not uncommon for the recruiters to extract the fees directly from the
worker. 25 New recruits are required to pay for their "return airfare, medi-
cal examinations, seafarers' book, visa, and [ ] administrative fee[s]" all
before they have had the opportunity to earn a penny as a seaman on a
cruise ship.26
The pre-employment debt that the cruise workers enter into, which
can sometimes total as much as two thousand U.S. dollars, has two
important effects on the cruise employee. 27 First, it drastically lowers the
worker's contractual wage. Depending on the exact terms of the contract
and the recruiter fees, a worker may spend as much as half of his or her
contract working to pay back the debt incurred during the hiring pro-
18. Klein, supra note 10.
19. War on Want, supra note 12, at 11.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 11-12.
23. Klein, supra note 10.
24. Id.
25. Id.; War on Want, supra note 12, at 17; Klein, supra note 14, at 16; International
Commission on Shipping, Ships, Slaves and Competition 252 (2000) [hereinafter IConS].
26. War on Want, supra note 12, at 17.
27. Id.
2011]1 1219
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cess. 28 The second, more disheartening, effect is that the worker lives in
fear that, if fired before he has paid back his debt, he will lose all the
money he has fronted. 29 This fear, combined with the precarious and
often desperate financial circumstances in which the worker enters into
the industry, often leads workers to accept the often grueling working
conditions and meager wages that go hand-in-hand with employment
onboard a cruise ship.3 0 As Ross A. Klein, a prominent cruise industry
critic, explains, the attitude among supervisors on cruise ships is "If you
don't like it here, you can go home." The workers' heavy pre-employ-
ment debt pressures them to accept that it is in their best interest to
"quickly learn to do their jobs and not to complain" if they wish to avoid
the devastation of returning to their home country and family with less
money than they started.3 '
Once aboard, the employees begin to work an arduous schedule
with almost no time off.32 A normal shift is often between ten and four-
teen hours long, and a survey by the International Trade Federation
found that over ninety-five percent of cruise ship employees work seven
days a week.3 3 An average contract is normally six to ten months long,
with the longer contracts typically reserved for those on the lowest rungs
of the cruise ship hierarchy. 34 For the length of the contract the foreign
workers often must deal with a quality of life that is less than ideal.
Crewmembers often live in cramped dorm-style quarters. They share
these quarters with an array of similarly situated employees form various
countries, however, because of the often lack of common language the
workers often only socialize with a workers from their home countries.
This segregated workforce is purposeful and serves as an important
labor-management tool for the cruise industry. By employing
crewmembers without a common language the cruise industry can pre-
vent its employees from rallying together, striking, and often from
organizing any type of independent union activity.37 The workers,
instead of being able to find solace and support in their coworkers, are
28. Klein, supra note 14, at 16.
29. Klein, supra note 10.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. A full, detailed discussion concerning every aspect of exploitation of the cruise employees
by the industry is beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed discussion see Ross A. KLEIN,
CRUISE SHIP BLUES: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE CRUISE SHIP INDUSTRY (New Society Publishers
2002).
33. War on Want, supra note 12, at 15.
34. Klein, supra note 14, at 16.
35. Testimony of Ross A. Klein, PhD Before the Subcomm. on Surface Trans. and Merch.
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, 109th Cong. 8 (2008).




left detached from those who could potentially be their fiercest allies."
One might expect that the employees' pay reflects the long working
hours, but according to the International Trade Federation, workers who
occupy the lowest positions on a cruise ship are paid as little as $400 a
month." Sixteen percent of cruise ship workers earn less than $500 a
month and over half earn less than $1000 a month.40 At these rates, the
cruise industry is paying its workers far less than minimum wage, and
one is led to wonder how they are legally allowed to do so. The answer
is that, although the industry operates largely out of North American
ports, its companies are nearly all headquartered in the United States,
and the majority of the passengers serviced are American, because it
registers its vessels under foreign flags, it has absolutely no obligation to
follow U.S. labor law.'
There are many reasons for cruise ship owners to register their
ships under a foreign flag. Primary among these is that, by flying
another country's flag, the ship owners, regardless of where they are
from, are able to legally transform the ship into a physical extension of
the sovereign country of registration.4 2 The cruise vessel is presumed to
be under the jurisdiction of the country of registration, and absent spe-
cific congressional intent to have a federal law apply extraterritorially,
U.S. law can be completely ignored.4 3 It is under this rubric that the
cruise industry is able to ignore, not only U.S. labor laws, but also feder-
ally mandated environmental and safety standards, as well as various
U.S. tax liabilities." The majority of cruise ships, around sixty percent,
are registered in Panama, The Bahamas, or Liberia.45
In addition to avoiding the application of U.S. labor standards, the
use of flags of convenience also shifts the burden of correcting viola-
tions of international ship-owning standards, such as those determined
38. Id.
39. Id. Data comes from an investigation conducted by the International Trade Federation in
2001. The ITF has not published an updated investigatory report, however it is likely that even if
wages have seen increases over the last decade the wages are almost necessarily far below those
which most Americans would find acceptable for the amount and type of work these employees
do.
40. Id. at 16.
41. Klein, supra note 10; Fla. Caribbean Cruise Ass'n, supra note 9.
42. Klein, supra note 10.
43. The topic of extraterritorial application of federal law is far beyond the scope of this note.
See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, 545 US 119 (2005) (holding that provisions in the
Americans with Disabilities Act are applicable to foreign-flagged ships because it was the
expressed congressional intent to have such law apply); see Paul T. Hinckley, Raising the Spector
of Discrimination: The Case for Disregarding "Flags of Convenience" in the Application of U.S.
Anti-Discrimination Laws to Cruise Ships, 3 MOD. Am. 75 (2007).
44. Hinckley, supra note 43, at 75-76.
45. Klein, supra note 10.
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by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International
Labour Organization (ILO), to the government of the flagged country.4 6
The ability of the flagged countries to enforce international law, and
their interest in doing so is suspect, in view of the large financial incen-
tive these countries have in allowing the cruise industry to go
unchecked. The governments of these countries stand to receive millions
of dollars in revenue from their flag registries and are often unwilling to
enforce international regulations for fear that their countries will suffer
economic harm if their flags cease to be flown.47
The predisposition to lax enforcement of international labor or
environmental standards is not the only reason one should look upon the
governments of the flagged countries with some degree of suspicion.
Due to the entrenched economic ties between the cruise industry and the
flagged countries, one also has to question whether the substantive law
of the flagged countries has been tailor-made to fit the expressed inter-
ests of the cruise industry. It is clearly within the cruise industry's inter-
est to register its ships under the least restrictive regulations available,
but as we will see, the cruise industry also frequently seeks to apply the
law of the country of registration during arbitration once the employee-
employer relationship has broken down.4 8 The huge financial benefit to
a country favored by the cruise industry should lead one to question
whether the often higher burden on plaintiffs under the substantive law
of the most popular flags is nothing so much as an incentive to secure
the relationship between a flagged country and its cruise companies. 4 9
III. THE CONFLICTING FEDERAL POLICIES OF PROTECTING FOREIGN
SEAFARERS AND PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
A. Congressional Protection of Foreign Seafarers
The United States has traditionally held a "long-standing presump-
46. IConS, supra note 25, at 87.
47. Liberia, for example generates between 15 and 20 million dollars a year from cruise lines
paying for the right to register under the Liberian flag. See War on Want, supra note 12, at 26.
48. Prokopeva v. Carnival Corp., No. C-08-213, 2008 WL 4276975, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(holding that reprinted choice-of-law provision mandates that the law of the flagged vessel on
which Seafarer is assigned at the time the cause of action accrues, without regard to principle of
conflicts of laws, is to be applied); see also Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11th
Cir. 2009); Javier v. Carnival Corp., No. 09cv2003-LAB (WMc), 2010 WL 3633173, at *8 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 13, 2010).
49. Some federally created causes of action, such as the Jones Act or the Seaman's Wage Act,
are not recognized under foreign laws and many flagged countries lack laws that offer
comparative protections to seafarers. Further, in countries like Panama, substantive law is
decidedly pro-defendant. In Panama, for example, plaintiffs are unable to receive punitive
damages on unpaid wage claims against their employer. See Javier, 2010 WL 3633173, at *8-10.
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tion that favors the welfare of a seaman.""o Recognizing the unique and
often exploited life of those who work at sea, the United States has
declared seamen "wards of admiralty" and as such has passed numerous
federal statutes designed to protect this class of worker." A complete
presentation of legislation passed on their behalf is not within the scope
of this note, however a brief discussion about the history of the passage
of the Seaman's Wage Act, Jones Act, and the clear intent of the federal
government to allow foreign seaman access to U.S. courts is warranted
because, as we will see in Part III, the cruise industry has been able to
use arbitration and choice-of-law provisions in its employment contracts
to severely limit these protections.52
Congress first passed legislation allowing foreign seamen the right
to bring causes of action against their employers in federal court in
1790.11 This long-standing commitment to seafarer's rights by Congress
and the courts stems from both the recognition that seamen are a tradi-
tionally disadvantaged and exploited class, and the realization that offer-
ing protection to foreign seafarers would have the additional benefit of
protecting the jobs of American seamen by removing the incentive to
hire foreign workers unable to seek redress in a United States court-
room.54 In 1823, Justice Story made explicit the policy of the Court
when it came to seaman's rights, stating, "Every court should watch
with jealousy an encroachment upon the rights of seamen, because they
are unprotected and need counsel."" This commitment to the protective
relationship between foreign seaman and the federal government was
reinforced by the Court in the 1920s and 1930s when it reiterated that it
was the specific intention of Congress to "open the doors of the federal
courts to foreign seamen."5 6 The Court reiterated in Bainbridge v.
Merchants' Transportation Co. that "The policy of Congress, as evi-
denced by its legislation, has been to deal with [foreign seamen] as a
favored class. . .[and in order] to effectuate this policy, statutes enacted
50. Susan Lee, Cruise Industry Liens Against the U.S. Penalty Wage Act, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J.
141, 147 (2006).
51. Justice Story made this statement while riding circuit in 1823. Harden v. Gordon 11 F.
Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047); see also id.
52. Han Deng, To Court or Arbitration: The Ninth Circuit Favors Arbitration in Foreign
Seafarers' Wage Claims in Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 22 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 191, 193
(2010).
53. Id. at 193; see Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.
2008).
54. Ryan C. Davis, Shutting the Courthouse Door: The Ninth Circuit in Rogers v. Royal
Caribbean Cruise Line Finds No Exceptions for Seafarers in Arbitration Provisions, 34 TUL.
MAR. L.J 365, 366 (2009).
55. Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 485.
56. Bainbridge v. Merchs.' Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278 (1932); Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon,
252 U.S. 348, 354 (1920).
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for their benefit should be liberally construed.""
As Bainbridge makes clear, it has long been Congress's policy to
allow foreign seamen the protection of a federal courtroom. One of the
earliest means of opening up the federal doors to foreign seamen was
through the passage of what is now known as the Seaman's Wage Act.5
Sponsored by Senator Robert La Follette in 1915, the Seamen's Act, of
which the Seaman's Wage Act is included, was an effort to grant seafar-
ers the same rights enjoyed by industrial workers.59 Described as "the
Magna Carta of the sea," the Act codified many tenets of American
jurisprudence that had been enforced since as early as 1790.60 Among
the rights guaranteed in the Seamen's Wage Act was the right of a sea-
farer, whether foreign or not, to sue his or her employer for the enforce-
ment of wage provisions. 6 1 Among the guarantees provided to seafarers
through this legislation are: the right to be paid the full amount due to
him or her within twenty-four hours after the end of the voyage; the
right to two days wages for each day payment is delayed; the right to be
paid regardless of the earnings of the ship; as well as the right to collect
penalties for unlawful discharge.6 2 Subsection (i), which explicitly states
that the Seaman's Wage Act "applies to a seaman on a foreign vessel
when in a harbor of the United States," specifically grants the right of
the seafarer to use "[t]he courts. . .for the enforcement of this section."6 3
The Seaman's Wage Act, and specifically the right of a seaman to
sue his or her employer for unpaid wages in federal court, was upheld by
the Supreme Court in U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc., v. Arguelles.' There, a
seaman, Arguelles, sued his employer in federal court instead of
attempting to vindicate his rights through the arbitration agreement in
his employment contract.65 The Supreme Court reversed the district
court's holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction, finding "no sug-
gestion in the legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 that grievance procedures and arbitration were to . .. assume ...
the roles served by the federal courts protective of the rights of seamen
since 1790."66 As we will soon see, the policy considerations that helped
57. Bainbridge, 287 U.S. at 282.
58. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2006).
59. WoRK IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLICY, AND SOCIETY 356 (Carl E.
Van Horn & Herbert A. Shaffner eds., 2003).
60. Id.
61. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2006); Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1152
(9th Cir. 2008).
62. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(a), (b), (f), (g) (2006).
63. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (2006).
64. 400 U.S. 351 (1971).
65. Id. at 364.
66. Id. at 352, 356.
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the Court decide Arguelles, as well as many of the cases dealing with
seaman's rights since the late early-nineteenth century, are not the same
policy considerations that have informed recent court decisions on the
issue of whether federal claims must be arbitrated. Today's courts have
made expressly clear that the federal policy favoring arbitration is so
important that it has the ability to take federal claims from federal courts
and place them in the hands of private arbitrators.67
Federal courts are open to foreign seamen not only for wage claims,
but other causes of action as well. The Jones Act, the better-known name
of section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, sets out to protect the
"health, accident and disability benefits" of seafarers. 68 A reaction to the
perceived inadequacy of The Seamen's Act in vindicating claims of neg-
ligence and personal injury, the Jones Act created a federal cause of
action that allowed a seaman to sue for injuries stemming from negli-
gence on the part of an employer:
(a) Cause of Action
A seaman injured in the course of employment or, if the seaman
dies from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman
may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by
jury, against the employer...
(b) Venue
An action under this section shall be brought in the judicial dis-
trict in which the employer resides or the employers principal
office is located.69
Although the Jones Act, on its face, seems to only apply to U.S.
seamen, the Supreme Court has construed the statute liberally and
allowed foreign seaman to bring Jones Act complaints against their
employers in federal court if an eight-factor balancing test shows suffi-
cient ties between the employer and the United States. 0 Under the so-
called Hellenic test, the following factors are weighed to determine
whether an employer is a "Jones Act employer": (1) the place of the
wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the
injured seaman; (4) the allegiance of the defendant ship-owner; (5) the
place where the contract of employment was made; (6) the inaccessibil-
ity of a foreign forum; (7) the law of the forum; and (8) the employer's
base of operation." As cruise ships tend to call on American ports,
advertise to American customers, make repairs within the United States,
67. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc,. 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
68. 46 U.S.C. §55101 (2006); The Jones Act, WORLDWIDE TRAVEL & CRUISE AsS'N. INC.,
http://www.cruiseco.com/Resources/jones-act.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
69. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 (2009).
70. 46 U.S.C. §55101; see Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 306-09 (1970).
71. Hellenic, 398 U.S. at 306-309.
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and frequently be owned by American interests, there is little debate that
the Jones Act is applicable to their foreign workers.7 2
B. A Preference Toward Arbitration
The statutory rights granted to foreign seamen through the Sea-
man's Wage Act and the Jones Act are not enough, however, to guaran-
tee a foreign seaman's day in federal court. Running counter to the
policy of protecting foreign seafarers is the seemingly greater policy
commitment of the federal government to favor and promote interna-
tional arbitration. The reasons for Congress and the courts to favor the
enforcement of international arbitration agreements are obvious. A
strong policy that favors international arbitration promotes "international
comity, predictability, and economic efficiency."" Unfortunately for the
foreign workers, this policy also often results in the total deprivation of
the workers' ability to receive justice and violates the intent if not the
letter of federal laws designed to ensure seamen's rights.
Federal arbitration law has been codified in the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") and the "United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards" ("the Convention"). The
FAA, which was first enacted in 1925, was passed with the expectation
that it would place private arbitration agreements within employment
contracts on "equal footing with other contracts."" The FAA applicabil-
ity to maritime transactions and commercial contracts was contemplated
at its inception. As the statute states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a contro-
versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the
revocation of any contract.77
72. Pandazopoulos v Universal Cruise Line, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Henry v.
Windjammer Barefoot Cruises, 851 So. 2d 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2003); Wesley
Kobylak, Annotation, Applicability of Jones Act (46 U.S. C.A. Appx. § 688) to Foreign Seamen,
Foreign Ships, or Other Foreign Circumstances, 68 A.L.R. FED. 360 §8 (2009).
73. 2 ROBERT FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 1:36 (5th ed. 2003).
74. Matthew Nickson, Closing U.S. Courts to Foreign Seamen: The Judicial Excision of the
FAA Seaman's Arbitration Exception from the New York Convention Act, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 103,
106 (2006).
75. 9 U.S.C. §§1-14, 201-208 (2006); A third chapter which implemented the Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration is also incorporated within chapter
9 but is not applicable to this discussion. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2006).
76. Nickson, supra note 74, at 106.
77. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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Despite this language, however, the FAA also contains an exception that
takes the FAA out of the realm of certain employment disputes. The
language specifically states, "nothing herein contained [within the FAA]
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce."" While a plain-language reading of this exception
would suggest that the FAA could not be used to compel a foreign sea-
man, who works as an employee of a cruise ship, to submit his claims to
arbitration, the Supreme Court has construed the exception narrowly,
holding the exception to only apply to "contracts of employment of
transportation workers."" In Bautista v. Star Cruises, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit similarly struck down the argument that the FAA's exception for
seamen's contracts took foreign cruise employees out of the FAA's arbi-
tration mandate.o In Bautista, a group of Filipino crewmembers and
spouses attempted to sue Star Cruises in Florida state court after being
injured or killed following a boiler explosion.8 ' The workers had all
signed an arbitration agreement within their employment contract and
agreed to arbitrate all disputes in the Philippines.82 Star Cruises removed
the case to federal district court under the Convention Act, "which per-
mits removal before the start of trial when the dispute relates to an arbi-
tration agreement or arbitral award covered by the convention."8 3 The
workers, however, argued that under the plain language of the FAA,
they should be excluded from the Act and not compelled to arbitrate
their claim. The Eleventh Circuit rejected their arguments, finding that
the exception to the FAA did not apply because it conflicted with the
Convention. In so ruling, the court held that there is a hierarchal status to
Title 9 and that the FAA only applies when it does not conflict with the
Convention.84
The Convention Act, used in Bautista to get around the plain lan-
guage exception of the FAA, was passed in 1970 as a means of requiring
the United States to adhere to the Convention." The Convention incor-
porates many of the provisions of the FAA, as well as extends the power
of a court to compel arbitration agreements between parties from coun-
78. Id. § 1.
79. The Eleventh Circuit held that the exception did not apply because it conflicted with the
Convention. The Court held there is a hierarchal status to title 9 and that the FAA only applies
when it does not conflict with the Convention. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
119 (2001).
80. Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.2d 1289 (1lth Cir. 2005).
81. Id. at 1292.
82. Id. at 1293.
83. Id. at 1292.
84. Id. at 1295-1302.
85. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006); Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F.3d 1148,
1151-53 (9th Cir. 2008).
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tries who are signatories to the Convention.8 6 Of the 192 United Nations
member states, 142 have adopted the Convention, including countries
whose flags are commonly flown by the cruise industry or are a common
source of cruise-employees." Unlike the FAA, the Convention contains
no exceptions that could arguably prevent its application to specific
types of employees, and is applicable by its own terms to all arbitration
agreements "arising out of legal relationships that are 'considered as
commercial.""' This language has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to include employment agreements within the definition of com-
mercial relationship. 89 .
C. Effects of Compelling Arbitration of Seafarers' Claims
The strong federal policy in favor of arbitration has denied cruise
ship employees the ability to not only sue in federal court, but to also
potentially place employees in a position that makes it difficult for arbi-
trators to hear their case. This, of course, discourages employees from
asserting their rights at all. A standard contract between a cruise
employee and the cruise lines will include, in addition to the "duration
of the contract, the position accepted, and the monthly salary and hours
of work," stringent arbitration agreements that include choice-of-law
and forum choice provisions.9 o The arbitration portion of a boilerplate
contract used by Carnival Cruise Lines, the largest cruise line in the
world, is illustrative of the types of provisions common in most employ-
ment contracts that foreign cruise ship workers are required to sign:
Any and all disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agree-
ment, including any question regarding its existence, validity, or ter-
mination, or Seafarer's service on the vessel, shall be referred to and
finally resolved by arbitration under the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation/Intemational Rules, which Rules are deemed to be incorpo-
rated by reference into this clause. The number of arbitrators shall be
one. The place of arbitration shall be London, England, Monaco, Pan-
ama City, Panama or Manila, Philippines, whichever is closer to Sea-
farer's home country. The Seafarer and [Carnival Cruise Lines] must
arbitrate in the designated jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other
jurisdictions. The language of the arbitral proceedings shall be
English. Each party shall bear its own attorney's fees, but [Carnival
Cruise Lines] shall pay for the costs of arbitration.. .This Agreement
shall be governed by, and all disputes arising under or in connection
86. Rogers, 547 F.3d at 1154.
87. NEW YORK CONVENTION, Contracting States, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-
york-convention-countries/contracting-states (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
88. Rogers, 547 F.3d at 1154.
89. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001).
90. Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.2d 1289, 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2005).
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with the Agreement or Seafarer's service on the vessel shall be
resolved in accordance with, the laws of the flag of the vessel on
which Seafarer is assigned at the time the cause of action
accrues. . .The parties agree to this governing law notwithstanding
any claims for negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance, cure, fail-
ure to provide prompt, proper and adequate medical care, wages, per-
sonal injury, or property damage which might be available under the
laws of any other jurisdiction.'
Agreements such as the one reproduced above are often presented to the
employee moments before, and are a requirement of boarding the ship.92
In Javier v. Carnival Corp., the employee, a Peruvian Carnival crew
member who was injured during her employment, explained the circum-
stances under which she signed the employment agreement by which she
agreed to arbitrate all claims in Panama and in accordance with Panama-
nian law:
As an employee, I was compelled to sign without reading because
there are so many tasks to be completed when one first boards the
vessel and commences a voyage. I could not receive my cabin keys
or unpack luggage until I signed the Carnival contract. This entire
event of boarding the vessel, signing the Carnival contract, and
receiving cabin keys occurs in a matter of minutes and only after
employees have traveled from their home country, passed through
immigration, and boarded the vessel.9
The proximate duress is even more significant when one considers
the practical hardships faced by employees who refuse to sign such con-
tracts. Many cruise ship employees take their jobs and commit to such
conditions out of a desperate need for income. This desperation compels
them to spend thousands of unearned dollars, often borrowed from loan
sharks, family, or friends, to secure their job.94 In many cases the worker
has already paid for their return ticket and uniform before starting work,
and has said their painful goodbyes to their families with the promise of
being able to send money back home to support them.95 After hours of
travel, the employee arrives at the embarkation dock, is tired from his or
her travels, and only desires a short rest before beginning their first ten
to fourteen hour shift. They are presented a contract, in what is often not
91. Prokopeva v. Carnival Corp, No. C-08-213, 2008 WL 4276975, at *2 n.7 (S.D. Tex.
2008); see also Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11th Cir. 2009) (analyzing an
employment agreement between a Carnival Cruise Line employee and the company which is
substantively identical to the one presented above).
92. Javier v. Carnival Corp., No. 09cv2003-LAB (WMc), 2010 WL 3633173, at * 1-2 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 13, 2010).
93. Id. at *2.
94. War on Want, supra note 12, at 17.
95. Id.
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their native language, knowing that refusal would result in the loss of
their deposit, job, home, and livelihood.
Despite the vastly unequal bargaining power held by the cruise
industry vis-A-vis its employees, courts have shown themselves
extremely willing to compel enforcement of arbitrations agreements
such as the one shown above. The Eleventh, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits,
whose jurisdiction includes the port of Miami (the most popular embar-
kation port in the world) and seven of the top ten most popular ports in
the country, have adopted the following requirements as a prerequisite to
compelling arbitration: that (1) there is an agreement in writing to arbi-
trate the dispute; (2) the agreement provides for arbitration in the terri-
tory of a signatory to the Convention; (3) the agreement to arbitrate
arises out of a commercial legal relationship; and (4) there is a party to
the agreement who is not an American citizen.9 6 These requirements
were, by design, created to promote arbitration. As such, courts have
determined only to impose a "limited," and frankly, superficial inquiry
into whether compelling arbitration is proper and they are in seemingly
unanimous agreement that a standard employment contract, such as the
one discussed above, satisfies all four requirements.9 7
One has to question the rationality of a system that purports to
respect a legal defense of unconscionability and duress with regard to
contracts, but refuses to invalidate agreements entered into under the
circumstances described earlier. Courts, in interpreting the validity of
cruise ship employment agreements, have held that being placed into an
inferior bargaining position or having to sign a contract in a rushed man-
ner does not render the contract invalid.98 In fact, courts have gone so far
as to say that a "Hobson's choice to either accept a seafarer agreement
and work or reject the agreement and disembark does not constitute
duress."99
These decisions are at odds, not only with instinctive notions of
96. Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.2d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005), Francisco v. Stolt
Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2002); Balen v. Holland Am. Line Inc., 583 F.3d
647, 652 (9th Cir.2009); Business Research & Economic Advisors, The Contribution of the North
American Cruise Industry to the U.S. Economy in 2009 (2010), available at http://clia-facts-cdn-
remembers.s3.amazonaws.com/998074b443904888538 81 fecal 9ac777.pdf.
97. Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 339 (5th Cir.2004); Thomas
v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1117-20 (11th Cir. 2009).
98. See Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1301-02; Krstic v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 09-
23846-CIV, 2010 WL 1542003, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010) (bargaining disparity is not a
defense to the enforceability of a contract); Henriquez v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No
09-21950-CIV, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 129453 at *10-11 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2009) (denying the
opportunity to review contract does not constitute duress).
99. Javier v. Carnival Corp., No. 09cv2003-LAB (WMc), 2010 WL 3633173, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (citing Hodgson v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, No 09-20798-CIV 2009 WL
6364071 at *12 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009)).
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unconscionability, but also with long-standing case law that holds that
unequal bargaining power and a lack of opportunity to negotiate make a
contract procedurally unconscionable.'"O The Eleventh Circuit, in Bau-
tista, justified finding that these sorts of contracts, agreed upon under
apparent duress, are not unconscionable when considered in the light of
the strong federal policy bias in favor of promoting international arbitra-
tion.'o' What the Bautista court suggested by such a ruling is against
both common understandings of contractual defenses and common
sense. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the defenses available under
the Convention are narrower than those available in domestic contracts
and the unconscionability doctrine, when applied to situations of interna-
tional arbitration, is substantially heightened when compared to disputes
not controlled by the Convention. 0 2
This type of reasoning is an example of judicial obfuscation and
allows the federal policy of promoting international arbitration to oblit-
erate standard definitions of substantive U.S. law. This type of decision
creates a dangerous precedent, one which could be used to invalidate or
redefine many accepted areas of jurisprudence, or worse, create a system
which allows laws to be discriminately applied, or ignored, when spe-
cific groups are involved. While it is important for courts to consider
policy implications and create decisions with a certain degree of flexibil-
ity, the precedent set in Bautista with regards to interpreting defenses
under the Convention is too amorphous to be rational judicial
precedent. 103
IV. THE THOMAS DECISION
As we have seen in Part III, the dual federal policies of opening up
the courts to foreign seamen and promoting and enforcing international
arbitration agreements are often at odds with each other. Despite the
dual commitment, however, the federal policy towards arbitration has,
over the past 40 years, been deemed to outweigh the commitments made
to seafarer's rights." The Eleventh Circuit's Bautista decision repre-
sented a low point in seamen's rights. Through judicial sleight of hand,
100. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus. Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002); see
also 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTs § 18:10 (4th ed. 2004).
101. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302-03.
102. Id.
103. Other courts, such as those interpreting the Ninth Circuit, have denied unconscionability,
not because the contract was procedurally fair, but rather because the contract was not
substantively unfair. See Javier, 2010 WL 3633173, at *12; Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 783 (noting
that to successfully bring a defense of unconcionability the defendant must show that the contract
was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable).
104. Nickson, supra note 74; Javier, 2010 WL 3633173, at *3; Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294.
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the court interpreted the FAA and the Convention Act so as to produce
not only an irrational result, but also one that ignores settled federal
policy. 105
Four years after the Bautista decision, the Eleventh Circuit decided
Thomas v. Carnival Corp., which seemed to signal a shift towards a
more balanced federal policy, one that attempts to satisfy both the urge
to promote arbitration and to protect foreign seafarers' federally created
rights." The case involved Puliyurumpil Mathew Thomas, an injured
Indian national employed as a waiter on the Panamanian flagged Carni-
val cruise ship Imagination, attempting to enforce federal statutory
rights in U.S. court.10 7 Thomas sustained injuries to his spine, shoulder,
and leg after slipping and falling while working a shift in the ship's
dining room.108 Thomas's employment agreement, signed before his
accident, contained no arbitration agreement.'" Following the accident,
Thomas attempted to return to work, but as a result of both his injuries
and subsequent disabilities, which Thomas attributed to Carnival's inad-
equate medical treatment, he was forced to sign off the ship. 1 o Approxi-
mately eleven months after the accident, Thomas returned to work on
the Imagination.'" Before gaining entry to the ship, however, he was
presented with, and required to sign, a new employment agreement.112
The new agreement contained provisions mandating that "any disputes
would be arbitrated in the Philippines and resolved under Panamanian
law." 13
After two months back at work, shipboard physicians told Thomas
that the injuries he sustained during his accident "rendered him unfit for
continuing his duties."' 14 Thomas left the ship under a medical sign-off
and brought action against Carnival in Florida state court seeking,
among other things, damages under the Jones Act and past wages under
the Seaman's Wage Act.'15 The case was removed, through the deter-
mined applicability of the Convention Act, to federal court, and Carnival
moved to compel arbitration."' Relying on the arbitration and choice-
105. Nickson, supra note 74.
106. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009).
107. Id, at 1115.
108. Id.






115. Id. at 1115 (in addition to the Jones and Seaman's Wage Act claims, Thomas also brought
unseaworthiness and failure to provide adequate maintenance and cure claims under general U.S.
maritime law).
116. Id. at 1114-15.
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of-law provisions contained in the second employment agreement, the
district court granted Carnival's Motion to Compel Arbitration in the
Philippines, as well as the choice-of-law provision, which called for the
arbitration to be decided under Panamanian law."'
Thomas advanced a number of arguments during his appeal of the
lower court's decision. First, he argued that the jurisdictional prerequi-
sites set forth in the Convention Act were not satisfied.I"1 The Conven-
tion Act's writing requirement, Thomas argued, was not satisfied
because the original employment contract, which was in force at the
time of his injuries, contained no arbitration agreement. 9 Thomas fur-
ther contended that his employment contract could not be defined as a
"commercial contract" and was therefore outside the scope of the Con-
vention Act.120 Alternatively, he asserted that compelling arbitration and
forcing him to arbitrate his claims in a forum that would apply non-U.S.
law violated U.S. policy and acted as a prospective waiver of his feder-
ally afforded rights.1 2 ' As we will see, the Eleventh Circuit was able to
craft a decision that, while imperfect, seemed to value both the policy of
enforcing international arbitration agreements and affording protection
to foreign seafarers.
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed Thomas' contention that his
employment contract did not satisfy two of the four jurisdictional pre-
requisites that the Convention Act required to bring an employment con-
tract under its control.' 22 The court recognized that, "barring an
affirmative defense that prevents application of the Convention Act, the
Court should compel the parties to arbitrate" if the four jurisdictional
requirements are met.1 23 Thomas conceded that the requirements that the
contracted arbitration venue be a signatory to the Convention and that
117. Id.; 9 U.S.C. §§ 205-206 (2006) provides the following provisions:
Where the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a State court relates
to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention [on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards], the defendant or
defendants may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove such action or
proceeding to the district court .. . where the action or proceeding is pending. . . . A
court having jurisdiction under this chapter [9 USCS §§ 2011 may direct the
arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided
for, whether that place is within or without the United States.
118. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1114-15.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Thomas also argued that his Seaman's Wage Act claim is categorically outside the scope
of the Convention. The court rejected this contention on the basis of its decision in Lobo v.
Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 488 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2007). Id.
122. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1117.
123. Id.
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one party to the agreement be a non-U.S. citizen had been met. 24 What
Thomas took issue with were the requirements that the agreement to
arbitrate be in writing and that his employment contract constituted a
commercial relationship.12 5 The court quickly rejected Thomas' asser-
tion that his job contract fell outside the definition of a "commercial
contract." 26 Relying on its previous decision in Bautista, the court
emphatically reaffirmed its prior holding that "seamen employment con-
tracts are commercial."12 7
The court found the question of whether the arbitration agreement
constituted a writing under the Convention's requirements more difficult
to resolve.128 The court held that the original contract, which contained
no arbitration clause, could not be said to be a writing to arbitrate the
Jones Act claims because those claims accrued before the new employ-
ment agreement went into effect.'29 The court held that all but one of
Thomas' wage claims against Carnival accrued before the new employ-
ment agreement took effect, and in so finding, rejected Carnival's argu-
ment that, in signing the second agreement, Thomas retroactively
consented to arbitration of his past claims. 13 0
After determining that Thomas' claims for wages were enforceable
under the Convention Act's prerequisites, the court next turned to
Thomas' affirmative defenses to arbitration. Article V of the Convention
allows parties in a proceeding to compel arbitration to put forth affirma-
tive defenses as a means of quashing the arbitration.' 3 1 It states that:
"Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused
if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforce-
ment is sought finds that . . . [t]he recognition or enforcement of the
award would be contrary to the public policy of that country." 32
The argument Thomas put forth is that, because the arbitration
agreement forces him to arbitrate U.S. statutory claims under non-U.S.
law, the arbitration clause effectuates a waiver of his U.S. rights and is
therefore against public policy. 3 In considering Thomas' argument, the




127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 1118.
129. Id. at 1118-19.
130. Id. at 1119.
131. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 5, June
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.




decisions in Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.134
and Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer.135 In its 1985
Mitsubishi decision, the Supreme Court upheld an order compelling
arbitration in Japan of Sherman Act claims between a Japanese car man-
ufacturer and its Puerto Rican distributor.136 The Court held that,
because the parties had stipulated that American law would apply, there
was no public policy violated in leaving the statutory claims to be
decided by the Japanese arbitrator.13' The Eleventh Circuit noted, how-
ever, that the Supreme Court's warning in Mitsubishi that if "the choice-
of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective
waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies . . . we could have
little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy. "138
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Mitsubishi from the Court's
1995 decision in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. MV Sky Reefer.139
Vimar involved dispute between an American fruit distributor and a Jap-
anese shipping company.14 0 After receiving a shipment of damaged
fruit, the American distributor attempted to sue the Japanese shipper."'
The shipping company sought a stay of litigation and an order to compel
arbitration in Japan under an arbitration agreement in accordance with
the enforcement provisions of the FAA.'4 2 The distributer argued that
enforcing arbitration would violate public policy because the arbitrator
would likely not apply American law.' 4 3 The Court held that because the
arbitration agreement was silent on the issue, and it was therefore
unclear what law would be applied to the distributor's claims, the arbi-
tration agreement did not violate public policy.'" The Vimar Court con-
cluded by holding that "arbitration clauses should be upheld if it is
evident that either U.S. law definitely will be applied or if there is a
134. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
135. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Thomas, 573
F.3d at 1120-22.
136. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614.
137. Id. at 628, 637.
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.
138. Thomas v. Carnival Corp. 573 F.3d 1113, 1121 (1lth Cir. 2009) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. at 637).
139. Vimar, 515 U.S. at 530; Thomas, 573 F.3d at 112t.
140. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1121.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1122.
144. Id.
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possibility that it might apply and there will be a later review." 4 5
In Thomas, the Eleventh Circuit found that, under the Vimar test,
Carnival's arbitration and choice-of-law provisions violate federal pub-
lic policy and are therefore void under Article V of the Convention.14 6
The court first found that Thomas' employment agreement explicitly
required arbitration to be conducted in the Philippines under Panama-
nian law. 147 Because Panamanian law does not recognize the Seaman's
Wage Act as a valid cause of action, and the arbitrators are "bound to
effectuate the intent of the parties irrespective of any public policy con-
siderations," the arbitration agreement operates "to completely bar
Thomas from relying on any U.S. statutorily-created cause of
actions."1 4 8 It went on to find that there was no adequate assurance of
post-arbitration review.149 Because Thomas only had one issue to be
decided during arbitration, it was likely that Thomas would never have
the opportunity to have a court review the arbitrator's decision during
enforcement, as it was unlikely he would be granted an award to
enforce.150
The Thomas decision, although appearing to take steps to assure
seafarer's rights, is far from a perfect decision. There are a number of
questions the Eleventh Circuit leaves unanswered that have the potential
to complicate matters for seafarers attempting to assert their statutory
rights in the future. For instance, it is unknown how the Eleventh Circuit
would rule on the question of the validity of choice-of-law provisions
when, in addition to statutory claims, general maritime claims that have
a reasonable equivalent in the substantive law of the choice-of-law coun-
try are alleged."' Another question left unanswered by the court is what
it meant in Thomas when it based the applicability of a choice-of-law
provision on whether U.S. law will definitely apply or whether it might
145. Id. at 1123.
146. Id. at 1123-24.
147. Id. at 1123. The agreement provides:
The Agreement shall be governed by, and all disputes arising under or in connection
with this Agreement or Seafarer's service on the vessel shall be resolved in
accordance with, the laws of the flag of the vessel on which Seafarer is assigned at
the time the cause of action accrues, without regard to principles of conflicts of laws
thereunder. The parties agree to this governing law, notwithstanding any claims for
negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance, cure, failure to provide prompt, proper
and adequate medical care, wages, personal injury, or property damage which might
be available under the laws of any other jurisdiction.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1124 n.17 (The court, in a footnote, disregarded Thomas' final contention that the
Seaman's Wage Act was not subject to the Convention because the date of the Seaman's Wage
Act recodification occurred after the Convention was already in effect.).
151. Rivas v. Carnival Corp., 2010 WL 1837807, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
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apply and is subject to review. 152 It is unclear at what point it must
become obvious that U.S. law will apply, or whether the party compel-
ling arbitration can simply stipulate to the applicability of U.S. law
despite inconsistency in the contractual language.15' Florida's Southern
District Court has certified these questions, but at the time of this arti-
cle's writing no date of review has been scheduled. 154
Despite these unanswered questions, the Thomas decision appears
to have brought the Eleventh Circuit towards a revitalized period of pro-
tection of seafarer's rights. Since its decision, a number of cases decided
by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida have held
that, while arbitration and forum provisions within employment con-
tracts are enforceable, the choice-of-law provision is severable.' 55 Thus,
the lower courts have used Thomas as a means of striking a balance
between the two often-conflicting federal policies. Courts will compel
arbitration to foreign venues in accordance with the arbitration agree-
ment and the enforcement provisions of the Convention, but will not
hesitate to sever the choice-of-law provisions and demand U.S. law be
applied when statutory claims are to be arbitrated. As we will see in this
note's final section, however, the realities of the cruise industry's labor
practices render the headways made by the Eleventh Circuit in Thomas
almost completely meaningless to the majority of the exploited employ-
ees working for the cruise industry.
V. CONCLUSION: AN INEFFECTUAL DECISION
The Thomas decision appears, on its face, to have reinvigorated the
Eleventh Circuit's commitment to the application of federally created
rights to foreign seafarers. The decision, however, fails to take into
account the hardships and realities that go hand-in-hand with a life at
sea, and how those realities affect a seafarers' ability to submit to arbi-
tration in the first place. The cruise industry's labor model relies upon a
continuous stream of cheap, foreign labor that is too poor or too desper-
ate to quit or complain. The cruise industry sponsors recruiting agents in
third-world countries who routinely charge prospective employees up to
five months pay to secure a job, and then demands these employees
perform grueling and intensive work, for months on end without a day
off, at sweatshop wages.'5 6 The fear of losing their job and being black-
152. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123.
153. Rivas, 2010 WL 1837807, at *2.
154. Id. at *3.
155. See, e.g., Dockeray v. Carnival Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Matthews
v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Krstic v. Princess Cruise
Lines, Ltd., No. 09-23846-CIV, 2010 WL 1542003 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010).
156. War on Want, supra note 12, at 11-17.
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listed as a troublemaker often inhibits these workers from complaining
or demanding overtime pay or time-off, and when the relationship
between the employee and employer finally does break down, and a
labor dispute arises, the only way for the employee to vindicate his or
her claims is to submit to arbitration in a country that is often far from
home, and in a language that is not their own.
The Thomas decision's flaw, and the principle reasons for its inef-
fectiveness, is that it purports to eliminate prospective waivers from
employee contracts, but ignores the fact that an arbitration agreement's
choice-of-venue provision can be used as a prospective waiver of statu-
tory rights just as effectively as a choice-of-law provision. Compelling
arbitration to a foreign country, which essentially requires the employee
to either relocate to that country or hire an attorney to represent him,
often creates an insurmountable wall to the enforcement of the very
same federal rights the Thomas court attempted to protect. What these
contract provisions, with their mandatory arbitration clauses do, in prac-
tical terms, is to force workers with valid claims against their employers
to abandon these claims and return to work. The cruise industry knows
its workers, and knows the desperate conditions many of them are in
when they sign up for a life at sea. The industry knows that it is unlikely
if not impossible for a foreign worker to front the expense of travelling
to a foreign forum to have this claim heard and to pay an attorney to
represent him there.'
Even assuming that the costs of arbitration are not prohibitive and
that a wronged employee has the means and ability to seek to arbitrate a
claim rising under the Jones Act or the Seaman's Wage Act, one has to
wonder whether the strides made in Thomas are actually available. Post-
Thomas district court decisions suggest that the cruise industry appears
to still require its employees to sign a contract with arbitration clauses
that contain foreign choice-of-law provisions.' Such foreign legal sys-
tems often have no equivalent protection for the rights of seamen as are
secured by federal statutes. The workers who do the most onerous jobs
at sea for the least pay, those who might be most likely to have claims
against their employers arising under federal protective statutes, come
primarily from poor third-world countries.' They are likely poorly edu-
cated. One can easily imagine that at least some of these workers, per-
haps the majority of such claimants, will submit to arbitration
157. See Matthews, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 1326 (expressly rejecting the "prohibitive costs"
defense to a motion to compel arbitration).
158. See e.g., Dockeray v. Carnival Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Matthews v.
Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Krstic v. Princess Cruise
Lines, Ltd., No. 09-23846-CIV, 2010 WL 1542003 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010).
159. War on Want, supra note 12, at 11.
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proceedings governed by foreign law without even realizing that, in so
doing, that their statutory rights are effectively being destroyed.
The men and women who work in the cruise industry, and provide
the luxury that vacationers have come to expect, are in a situation with-
out a practical solution. Although groups like the International Trade
Federation have been lobbying for seafarers' rights for years, the appar-
ently simple solution of a guaranteed minimum wage and improved
working conditions may, paradoxically, not be entirely beneficial for
these workers in the long run.160 One of the major factors that draw
people into a cruising vacation, as opposed to a more traditional vaca-
tion, is the relative luxury one can get for their dollar.16 1 If the cruise
industry were to drastically change and workers received wages that
matched their productivity, it is possible that many people who enjoy
cruising and keep the industry growing would be priced out of their next
vacation.
The above scenario is far from a certainty, and some may say that it
is better to let the cruise industry die than to allow the exploitation of its
workers to continue. This view, however, is myopic and does not take
into account the considerable good generated by the cruise industry
worldwide. The industry provides a boon not only to the economy of
North America, but also furnishes millions of dollars in revenue to
debarkation points like the Caribbean, Bahamas, Greek Isles, Turkey,
Bermuda, and Mexico, as well as to flagged countries like Liberia and
Panama.162 Additionally, the cruise industry provides men and women
from some of the poorest and least industrialized places in the world the
opportunity to earn a wage and send money back to their home country,
even if that wage is extremely low by normal industrialized standards.
To allow cruise reforms to destroy these benefits completely would most
likely hurt more people in the long run than they would help.
Because of the realities of the cruise industry, it may be both
impractical and unjust to reform the system in a dramatic way in the
short-term in order to truly improve the lives of its foreign workers.
Instead, it appears that the only practical means of improving their situa-
tion is through small, incremental reforms. A discussion concerning how
to successfully reform the industry without destroying it is beyond the
scope of this note, or the expertise of its author, but further exploration
and discussion of this issue in the public forum is both needed and wel-
come. One proposal may be for both Congress and the courts to reaffirm
and revitalize the existing, but rarely exercised, federal policy of open-
160. Id. at 27.
161. Fla. Caribbean Cruise Ass'n, supra note 9.
162. Id.; War on Want, supra note 12, at 26.
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ing up the courts to foreign seafarers and for them to continue to push
back against the policy of allowing corporations with such a high degree
of unequal bargaining power to force a class of unsophisticated workers
into arbitration agreements that contain foreign venue and choice-of-law
provisions in the first place.
Although statistics are unavailable, common sense would dictate
that of the thousands of foreign cruise employees who might have valid
statutory claims against their employers, the majority of such workers
willing and financially able to bring a claim against their employer will
likely blindly submit to arbitration. Only a very small minority of work-
ers could properly be expected to recognize that the choice-of-law provi-
sion they signed when starting their employment would be used to
abrogate their rights, and an even smaller minority probably possesses
the sophistication, dedication, or money to challenge that provision in
federal court. For that small group-the men and women like
Puliyurumpil Mathew Thomas-the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Thomas is meaningful. However, for the rest of the industry's workers it
changes nothing.
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